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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22, transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)0) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Although the three issues raised by the City as the stated issues to be decided on
appeal generically address the relief which the City is asking for on appeal, they do not
identify the specific issues considered by the district court, as reflected in the district court's
Summary Ruling and which are at the heart of this case on appeal. Therefore, pursuant to
Rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Wheeler suggests the following
issues as the more specific and precise issues presented by this case on appeal:
Issue: Are the City's claims barred by the product liability two-year statute of
limitation found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3?
Standard of Review: Correctness for determining applicable statute of limitation;
clearly erroneous for a subsidiary factual determination. The applicability of a statute of
limitations is a question of law, which an appellate court reviews for correctness. A
subsidiary factual determination in relation to applying the correct statute of limitations is
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, ^f 32, 44 P.3d
741; Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City. 2004 UT App 436, If 8,104P.3d
646.
1

Issue: Are the City's claims barred by the retained control doctrine?
Standard of Review: Correctness, no deference. An appellate court reviews a district
court's grant of summary judgment for correctness, according no deference to the district
court's legal conclusions. For a moving party to be entitled to summary judgment, it must
establish a right to judgment based on the applicable law as applied to the undisputed facts.
Thompson v.Jess. 1999 UT 22, ^ 12, 979 P.2d 322; Smith v. Hales & Warner Constr.. Inc..
2005UTApp38,^f6, 107P.3d701.
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
The following rules and statutes are determinative of the appeal or are of central
importance to the appeal. Their provisions are set out verbatim in the Addendum attached
hereto:
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e)
Utah R. Evid. 602
Utah R.Evid. 801
Utah R. Evid. 802
Utah R. Evid. 805
Utah Code Ann. §78-15-3
Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(b)(1), Plaintiff/Appellee Wheeler Machinery
Company ("Wheeler") submits the following additional statements concerning the case
which were not included in the Appellant's Brief or which otherwise need further
clarification:
1

For a long period of time the City of Hurricane ("City")1 explored the possibility of
adding electrical generators to its electrical system which could be powered by diesel
fuel. Ultimately in 1998 the project progressed to the point where the City sought and
obtained from Wheeler, a distributor of Caterpillar generators, a preliminary quote
with regard to two such generator sets. (R. at 201, 243-44.)

2.

At no time did the City ever give a written acceptance of any Wheeler quote. (R. at
196-97,432-35.)

3.

Once the August 1999 building construction plans were submitted to Wheeler, the
parties modified the terms of Wheeler's April 1999 written proposal, all of which
modifications were worked out between Wheeler and the City without the benefit of
any further writings. (R. at 196-97, 432-35.)

1

Plaintiff is designated as "Utah Local Government Trust," a company in the
business of securing insurance for governmental bodies. Because the lawsuit is a subrogation
claim and Utah Local Government Trust obtained the insurance for the City of Hurricane
which paid for the damage at issue in the case, the insurance company as the subrogee of the
Trust has brought the case in the name of the Trust. However, all of the activities at issue
were carried on by the City of Hurricane and its employees.
3

4.

Pursuant to Wheeler's February and April 1999 written proposals, Wheeler would
have been responsible for the installation of the cooling systems, the day tanks, the
exhaust system, and the fuel system piping from the day tanks to the engines. (R. at
202-03, 247-48.) However by October 1999 it was agreed that the City would place
the fuel tanks and radiators outside of the building, install the piping to the radiators
and fuel tanks, install the thimble in the roof,2 create a support for the mufflers for the
roof, place the mufflers on the roof, and install the exhaust pipe through the roof. (R.
at 197-98,205.)

5.

Once the City had selected a contractor to construct the building which would house
the generator sets, the City held regular construction meetings with its general
contractor, Telecor, and with its engineer, Alpha Engineering. No representatives of
Wheeler were invited to those construction meetings. (R. at 198-99, 206-07, 209,
286-89.)

6.

Exactly how the mufflers were to be placed and supported on the roof was a
determination made jointly by the City, Telecor, and Alpha Engineering after the
arrival of the exhaust mufflers, and such determination was made without Wheeler's
participation or input. (R. at 198-99, 206-07, 209, 286-89.)

7.

Specifically it was decided by the City, Telecor, and Alpha Engineering after

2

A thimble is a device placed in the roof members which allows the exhaust
pipe from a generator set to pass through the roof and connect to the muffler on the roof
without touching the roof members. Just above the roofline a cap is welded to the exhaust
pipe covering the opening created by the thimble to protect against moisture and other
elements from entering the building. The cap is commonly called a rain cap. Diagrams of
these components are found in the Record at pp. 430-31.

considerable discussion among themselves that in order to spread the weight of the
mufflers, long 4x4 timbers would be placed underneath the mufflers on the roof. In
addition, it was determined that extra roof beams would be installed. (R. at 286-89.)
8.

The metal cradles for the mufflers were created by Richard Carlson and his company,
Independent Welding, under the direction of the City. (R. at 206, 272-73, 276-77.)

9.

The invoices to Independent Welding paid by Wheeler did not identify any of the
materials or work for the creation of the metal cradles or the work for installing the
rain caps. (R. at 380-83.)

10.

The only instruction Mr. Carlson received from Wheeler in performing his work was
to make flanges for the exhaust pipe and weld them to the pipe. (R. at 275.)

11.

All instruction to Mr. Carlson as to welding on the rain caps over the roof thimbles,
including making the modifications to the rain caps, came from Don Johnson, a City
supervisor. (R. at 206, 267-271, 282.)

12.

City employees installed the exhaust thimbles in the roof, inserted the exhaust pipe
through the thimbles, placed 4x4 timbers on the roof, placed the metal cradles created
by Mr. Carlson on the roof, and then placed the mufflers on the metal cradles. (R. at
198, 206-07, 262-63, 265-67, 280-81.)

13.

The only design document anyone of behalf of the City could say was provided by
Wheeler after the August 1999 plans were prepared was a drawing of the thimble. (R.
at 253-54.) That drawing is found in the Record at p. 257.
5

14.

The fire took place on August 3, 2000, some eight months after the City took
occupancy of the building and began to use the generators. (R. at 3, 44.)
In addition to the foregoing additional facts, Wheeler objects to many of the claimed

facts stated in the City's brief on the basis that the cited evidence in the Record does not
support the facts alleged by the City. This is particularly true of the City's Relevant Facts
Nos. 7 (Wheeler and the City in fact agreed on many changes to Wheeler's bid), 9, 10, 11,
13 (Wheeler did not supply the muffler cradles), 16, 17,18 (Wheeler's materials did not
require or contemplate the wooden 4x4 supports), 20,21 (no discussion between Spears and
Johnson about the rain cap or thimble), 22, and 25 (Bob Spears said he did not inspect the
construction work done by the City and the general contractor, but Wheeler did start up and
test its own system. (R. at 329.)3 It should also be noted that throughout the Argument
section of its Brief, the City tries to introduce additional facts which are nowhere supported
in the Record.4 Particularly troublesome is the City's repeated claim that the 4x4 timbers
3

In analyzing the City's statement of facts below, after noting that the City had
failed to controvert many of Wheeler's statements of fact, the district court expressly noted
that "[cjareful examination of Plaintiff s disputes with Defendant's other statements of fact,
however, reveals that Plaintiff (a) has cited to materials which are not properly considered
in the context of summary judgment and (b) has exaggerated, and has occasionally
misrepresented, the substance of the material cited by Plaintiff in support of its attempt to
identify genuine issues of material fact." (R. at 479.) On appeal, the City has repeated the
same errors in its presentation of facts.
4

In its ruling, the district court expressly noted its concern about parties
introducing new or different facts on appeal than those that were presented to the district
court and upon which the district court relied in making its ruling, in effect "deliberately
reforming their cases for the purpose of appeal." (R. at 481.) Despite that express stated
6

were not only Wheeler's idea but also that they were installed by Richard Carlson under
Wheeler's direction. (See, e.g.. City's Brief at pp. 5-6, 20, 23-24.) Even the City's best
testimony on the subject (which as noted hereafter is highly disputed on several grounds and
which the district court rejected as inadmissible hearsay) does not identify either Wheeler or
Carlson as having any involvement in the placement of the 4X4 timbers.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Wheeler was granted Summary Judgment against the City on several different bases,
any one of which would support the granting of such a Motion. The City's Amended
Complaint sounds in product liability and was brought more than two years after the City's
claims arose. Thus, the City's claims are barred by reason of the products liability Statute
of Limitations. Further, the City's claims of defective work concern activities performed
either by the City or by an independent contractor who was directly and specifically
supervised by the City in all aspects of his work. Therefore the City's claims are also barred
by the doctrine of retained control, namely that Wheeler did not have any control over the
work claimed to be defective and, to the contrary, the City had specific control over the
same. The City's principal challenge to Wheeler's Motion now rests on the City's proffered
double hearsay statement by the City's expert concerning several conversations he allegedly
had or overhead approximately one year after the events in question. That testimony is
concern, the City has gone on to introduce new facts on appeal that were not argued below
and were not considered by the district court in its ruling, and as such appears to be
"reforming its case for the purpose of appeal."
7

barred by reason of hearsay and unreliability. Thus, the City has not raised any material
issue of fact which would defeat the Motion for Summary Judgment and the lower court's
ruling should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE CITY'S CLAIMS ARE DEFEATED BY TWO-YEAR PRODUCT
LIABILITY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The City has tried to characterize its claims against Wheeler as sounding in negligence

as well as in contract. However categorized, all of the City's claims go to Wheeler's sale to
the City of two diesel generator sets, including all components. More specifically, the
Amended Complaint at paragraph 9 alleges that once the generator sets were delivered and
installed, together with all component parts, the exhaust system leading from the generators
created a continuous stream of heated air directed at wooden supports on the roof which
resulted in a fire. As such, the City has effectively plead a product liability claim, namely
(1) the product was unreasonably dangerous due to a defect or defective condition, (2) the
defect existed at the time the product was sold, and (3) the defective condition was a cause
of the plaintiff s injuries. Lamb v. B&B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926,929 (Utah 1993).
See also Utah Product Liability Statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-15-6, which provides for
actions against manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers of products whose defects cause
"personal injury, death, or property damage.11

8

The limitations period on product liability cases is two years. Utah Code Ann. § 7815-3. It is undisputed that because the City's complaint was filed almost three years after the
fire, any claim based on product liability is defeated by the product liability two-year
limitation period. Therefore the question is whether the City can circumvent the product
liability limitation period by characterizing its claims against Wheeler as sounding in either
negligence or contract, when the facts which form the basis of such claims are the same facts
which support a claim sounding in product liability.5
A direct answer to the above question was provided in the Utah Federal Court case
of Strickland v. Gen. Motors Corp.. 852 F.Supp. 956 (D.Utah 1994). The Strickland court
first noted that Utah law had not defined the term "product liability," and therefore adopted
the definition put forward by Black's Law Dictionary, which defines "product liability" as
"the legal liability of manufacturers and sellers to compensate buyers, users, and even
bystanders, for damages or injuries suffered because his product has a defective condition^]"
Strickland, 852 F.Supp. at 958 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.). The Federal Court
next directly addressed the same statute of limitation issue involved in this case. The Federal
Court concluded that in order to further the public policy behind the Product Liability Act,
the two-year limitation period will prevail over and control the longer limitations period of
5

The initial complaint filed by the City (R. at 1-6) was based on a claim "that
the subject generators and/or their component parts and materials were not sold, supplied,
assembled, and/or installed in a reasonable and safe manner." (R. at 4,1J16.) That product
liability claim language was deleted in the Amended Complaint (R. at 37-47) after Wheeler
filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the product liability statute of limitations.
9

any alternative cause of action. Strickland, 852 F.Supp. 959 (legislative intent behind Utah
Product Liability Act was to limit actions based on defective products to two-year limitation
regardless of theory of liability alleged). See also McColling v. Synthes, Inc., 50 F.Supp.2d
1119, 1122 (D. Utah 1999) (product liability two-year limitation governs mixed cause of
action also containing liability and breach of warranty theories); Bishop v. Gentech, Inc.,
2002 UT 36, ^f 26,48 P.3d 218 ("allegations of negligence contained in a claim for products
liability do not transform the claim into one for ordinary negligence").
Although it dealt with a claim of defamation and not product liability, the very recent
case of Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81,

P.3d

, is instructive on the issue of mixed

causes of action with mutually conflicting limitations periods. The Plaintiff in that case, Dr.
Jensen, alleged separate instances of tortious conduct by Defendants occurring at three
different times, all of which except for the last instance occurred more than one year prior
to the filing of his suit. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the first two
defamation claims as occurring beyond the one-year statute of limitation applicable to
defamation cases. The Court then addressed Dr. Jensen's attempt to label some of the
otherwise barred defamation claims as actions grounded in "false light invasion of privacy,"
and thus not subject to the one-year limitation period. Because "false light" claims were not
identified in any statute of limitation, Dr. Jensen argued that they fell under the four-year
"carry all" provision. The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the false light claims
partook of the same nature and characteristics of defamation and therefore were covered by
10

the defamation limitation period despite the different characterization. Jensen at ]flf 49, 58.
The dispositive point for the Supreme Court was that the operative facts were the same for
both of the differently labeled causes of action. Id. at f 53.
Similarly in this case, the same dispositive operative facts are at issue regardless of
the label used or legal theory asserted, namely: (a) that part of the exhaust system which went
through the roof had a protective device called a thimble which kept the exhaust pipe from
touching the roof; (b) a so-called rain cap was placed above the thimble; and (c) it was the
modification of this rain cap to make it fit within the framework supporting the muffler
which the City claims caused the property damage in this case. To the extent such a claim
sounds in contract or negligence, it is still fundamentally a claim of product liability and thus
barred by the product liability limitation period.
A defect in the modification of the generators' exhaust system is a defect in the
product's overall "design" or "condition" that brings the case under the product liability
statute. Inasmuch as the City is alleging that the components of the generator sets, modified
as part of the delivery of the product, were the instrumentality of harm (see Amended
Complaint, «[ffi 9-10), it is effectively stating a product liability claim.6

6

In Utah, a court should look to the substance of a pleaded cause of action rather
than its label in determining the true nature of the cause of action and available remedies.
See Davidson Lumber Sales. Inc. v. Bonneville Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11,14 (Utah 1990) (court
should look to nature of action and not pleading labels chosen); Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d
864, 868 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("[i]n characterizing a cause of action, Utah courts look to the
nature of the action and not the pleading labels chosen").
11

Furthermore, as an integrated part of the generator product package, the exhaust
system is not severable for purposes of product liability or any other theory of liability. It
is incorrect to suggest that the generator engines were fit for their intended purpose but that
the accompanying exhaust system was unreasonably dangerous.7 To try to distinguish
between the two by arguing that one component of the unitary product package comes under
product liability while the other component of the same package comes under negligence (or
negligent performance of contract) would be the same as suggesting that an injury arising
from an electrical device, where the device's internal components otherwise worked fine but
only the electric cord was defective, involves a negligence claim and not a product liability
claim. Because Wheeler's product was part of a single, unitary package, and because the
product liability two-year limitation period had already run prior to the time the City filed
its Complaint, the district court was correct to grant Wheeler summary judgment on that
basis.
It is noteworthy that while the statute of limitation issue was fully explored by the
district court and was the primary basis for its dispositive ruling below, the City declines to
address it in any fashion in its Appellant Brief. However, in early arguments to the district
court, the City relied heavily on the case of Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 1999 UT 20,979 P.2d

7

In point of fact, the City actually claims that one or both of the generators were
defective. Thus the City's Relevant Fact 26 in its Brief (quoting from its own Amended
Complaint) states that one of the generators overheated, which led to excessive heat being
directed at the roof timbers.
12

317, in which the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that there could be a separate cause of
action for negligence aside from a cause of action for product liability. However, Slisze was
not decided in the context of conflicting statutes of limitation, but rather on the basis that the
plaintiff in that case had not met the burden to prove a claim under either product liability
or negligence. Thus Slisze is not in conflict with Strickland case and similar cases from
other jurisdictions.
The City further relied in its argument below on the case of Adler v. Bayer Corp.,
2002 UT 115,61 P.3d 1068, for the conclusion that the present case is a negligent installation
case rather than a product liability case. That claim is also in error. In Adler, the x-ray
processing machine at issue had been used without problems for several years prior to its reinstallation in a different area of the hospital. It was not new. The Utah Supreme Court
therefore found that the product itself was not unreasonably dangerous, but rather that the
harm in that case resulted from the improper reinstallation and faulty maintenance of the
machine.
Even though the City ignores or fails to address the fundamental statute of limitation
issue, the fact is that this issue was the primary basis upon which the district court properly
granted Wheeler summary judgment. Moreover, there is no issue of fact which would in any
manner undermine the district court's grant of summary judgment on that basis.

13

II.

THE CITY'S CLAIMS ARE DEFEATED BY THE RETAINED CONTROL
DOCTRINE.
Aside from the dispositive statute of limitations issue, the City's claims are likewise

defeated by the retained control doctrine. Under Utah law, "a principal employer is not
subject to liability for injuries arising out of its contractor's work unless the employer
'actively participates' in the performance of the work." Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22,1ffl
15-26, 979 P.2d 322. Stated another way, to be found liable for a contractor's faulty or
negligent work, the one employing the independent contractor must "exercise affirmative
control over the method or operative detail of that work." Johnson v. Dep't of Transp., 2004
UTApp 284,H 16, 98P.3d773.
Here, the claimed defective work on the rain cap8 was performed by Richard Carlson
and his company Independent Welding. Thus in order for Wheeler to be liable for Carlson's
allegedly negligent work, the City is required to show that Wheeler actively participated in
Carlson/Independent Welding's performance of the faulty work. However, there is nothing
in the record which demonstrates such activity to any degree. To the contrary, the unrebutted
testimony is that the City directed and supervised all such work. A few samples from the
deposition of Mr. Carlson sufficiently demonstrate that dispositive point:

8

Any claimed defective work not done by Carlson or his company was done by
the City or its general contractor, including the placement of the 4x4 support timbers. There
is no evidence that Wheeler directly performed any defective work.
14

Q.

And what were you to do besides acquiring the pipe and flanges?

A.

After acquiring the pipe and flanges, the City was installing it and they asked
me if I would finish welding 'em on site.

Q.

Who from the City was installing that?

A.

Don and the power department crew.

(R. at. 262.)
* * *

Q.

Tell me about the rain cap.

A.

The rain cap was brought to me by Don Johnson and he asked me to install it
and I did.

(R. at 267.)
* * *

Q.

And how did you physically, then, deal with that rain cap in securing it?

A.

I asked Don how he'd like me to put it on and he told me to make it fit in
between the channel-iron spacer and the muffler and weld it to the pipe at 3inch height, I believe he said, above the thimble.

(R. at 268.)
* * *

Q.

Did you tell him how you thought that it should be attached in any way?

A.

No.

Q.

You took your direction from Don Johnson?

A.

Yes.

(R. at 269.)
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* * *

Q.

And all of these instructions were coming from Don Johnson?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you ever have any- did you ever receive any instructions from the
contractor?

A.

No. I worked for Don Johnson. I was only there for a short period of time.

(R. at 270.)
* * *

Q.

And I think you said that other than your assistant and Don Johnson and you,
no one else was around when this project - when this installation of this rain
cap was taking place; is that correct?

A.

That's correct.

(R. at 271.)
* * *

Q.

And once again, I think you've answered this, but with regard to the creation
of the framework, from whom did you receive your directions on that?

A.

Don Johnson.

(R. at 274.)
* **

Q.

Now, you've indicated that you received your instructions from Don Johnson.
What, if any, instructions did you receive from Bob Spears?

A.

The only thing I received from Bob Spears was he asked me if I could get
those flanges made and install 'em, and I told him yes.

(R. at 275.)
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' [ I: in is, based 01 1tl ie evider ice ii i tl ne t ecot d before it, tl ic distt let < :c i it t was corret :t ii i
concluding that the work at issue "was not done by, at the direction of, under the control of,
or pursuant to a design provided by Wheeler." (R. at 482.) Therefore, the City's claims o f
negligence and breach of contract were likewise properly dismissed under the retained
control docti ine
III.

THERE WAS NO WRITTEN CONTRACT BETWEEN WHEELER AND THE
CITY.
Although the City has alleged a breach of contract cause of action, the Cii\ our;-*;

point to any formal acceptance by the City of either Hie February or the .\pr;i ! c)oc) u ritten
b.d- . r SV'hee ler. 1 lor is thet e ai ly written agreement betweei 1 me p.:^ ;•..-

l

'

•

early bufs submitted by Wheeler to the City outline some of the parameters by which
Wheeler was going to supply the generator sets. However as noted, those bids were
submitted at a time long before the structure in which the generator sets would be located had
been engineered. In the absence of any formal acceptance of tl; ie b i o or execution of nnv
writtei i agreement betweei 1 tl: ie parties, tl ie pai ties it istead i i lodified i• -

;;

.

:

-r •

arrangement on an ongoing basis, right up to the point of product deliver}. Ihus, as ib
established by uncontradicted testimony, various items originally identified in Wheeler's
April ivv9 proposal as items to be doi ie by VV heeler were specifically taken over and
accc n nplished by tl leCity. (R , it 19 7 98,205,20 7,262-63,265-6 7 280 81 ) ""I! I ler efoi e,ai iy
suggestion that the April, 199^ pr^ni >sa! req uired Wheeler to install or be responsible for the
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installation of the exhaust system and the thimble is totally contradicted by the facts of the
case as contained in the Record. As such, the district court's conclusions on this point should
be affirmed.
IV.

WHEELER SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED THE CITY'S CONTRACT
CLAIMS IN WHEELER'S INITIAL MEMORANDUM.
The City has attempted to overcome the district court's ruling by mischaracterizing

Wheeler's Memorandum submitted in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Specifically, the City claims that Wheeler did not raise the subject of the City's contract
claims in its initial Memorandum. One only need look at Wheeler's initial Memorandum to
determine that Wheeler specifically challenged the City's contract claims at several points.
At the outset of its Memorandum, Wheeler provided a "Statement of Undisputed Facts"
which specifically noted the lack of any written agreement between the parties. Moreover,
Wheeler's stated facts note how the City continually revised the nature and scope of
Wheeler's bid during the course of the project, and that such revisions were for the most part
made orally. See, e.g.. Statement of Undisputed Facts Nos.6-11, 15-18 (R. at 202-06.) It is
also important to note that the City never challenged certain parts of Wheeler's Undisputed
Fact No. 15, which established that Wheeler ultimately did not do many of the items clearly
stated in the February and April bids. (R. at 210.) Then in its argument, Wheeler identified
and addressed both of the City's two causes of action pled in the Amended Complaint, one
of which was the breach of contract claim. Wheeler's Memorandum then concluded that the
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City's claii i is, v '1 let! lei: soi u iding it i contract ot negligence,, were ban ed b> ti le prodi ict
liability statute of limitation. Furthermore, the City's contract claim was essentially a
rephrasing of its negligence claim and thus both theories were also addressed iti WIleeler's
argument concerning the retained control doctri ne anu u.c i u\ s supervision of tl le job's
wot k and design. Wheeler coi lch ided its Men lorai ldi tt n by again: i raising a. global el. lallenge
to the entirety of the City's Amended Complaint. There is thus no basis for the City's
mischaracterization of Wheeler's Memorandum as only addressing one of the City's stated
causes of action.
Wheeler's Reply Mei norai icli ii 1 i did i lot r aise or discuss issues n< )t already raised in
Wheeler's initial supporting Memorandum, except to the extent that Wheeler was responding
to issues raised in the City's opposition Memorandum. Wheeler's characterization in its
Reply Memorandum of the parties' arrangement as being one wherein Wheeler was a
supplier of pan-, anu components is simply a sun ti nary of W 1. leeler's argi iment it i its it litial
Mei i iora: J i ^

•-

v\ iveler fi illy preserved his attack 01 i tl le entirety oi the City s

Amended Complaint, and not merely the claim for negligence.
V

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT THE CITY'S
EXPERT'S PROFFERED TESTIMONY WAS INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY
The only testii i lony tl lat tl ic City adduces for tl le pi: opositioi i tl lat WI leelei directed the

modification to (he rain cap that resulted in the subsequent lire, that Wheeler had anything
to do with placing the 4x4 timbers on the roof of the building to help support the weight of

the mufflers, or that Wheeler was in any way involved in such work, are two hearsay
statements adduced by the City's retained expert, Richard McPherson, who had no
involvement with the project until after the fire.9 One statement is Mr. McPherson's double
hearsay testimony that in August of 2000 Don Johnson, a City employee, told Mr.
McPherson that in October of 1999 Bob Spears, a Wheeler employee, gave Mr. Johnson the
verbal instruction to "make it [meaning the rain cap] fit." (R. at 339-42.) The other
statement is Mr. McPherson's testimony that he heard unidentified Wheeler personnel talking
about Wheeler's putative involvement in the support system for the mufflers. (R. at 343-45.)
In other words, Mr. McPherson is testifying as to the purported statements of third and fourth
parties, and to conversations for which he was not present or had no direct participation, for
the truth of the proposition asserted, namely that Wheeler gave specific instructions relative
to the product modifications responsible for the fire and resultant property damages.
Utah R. Evid. 801(c) defines "hearsay" as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." By definition then, Mr. McPherson's recitations of out-of-court statements
qualify as hearsay, unless they fit under some exception. Utah R. Evid. 802 provides that
hearsay is not admissible except as otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Evidence.
"Hearsay statements have been generally discredited because they (1) lack trustworthiness
9

Mr. McPherson was called in by the City's insurance company after the fire.
Thus his first exposure to and dealings with the issues and personalities in this case was
around one year after the events in question giving rise to the litigation.
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and (2) the persoi 1 pi irporth ig to know the facts is not stating them under oath.'1 Slalcjn
Interest of K.D.S.. 578 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah 1978).
Utah law also provides that inadmissible evidence, including hearsay, cannot serve
as the basis for opposition to an otherwise well-supported summary judgr i lent i i lotioi i. See
Utah Iv "i V. r MMC) (aflidaviis supporiiii" ur opposing siimm;ir\ judgment motions shall
set forth "such facts as would be admissible in evidence"). See also GNS P'ship v. Fullmer,
873 I\2d 1157, i 164 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in
rilling on motion for summary judgment); see also Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation
Corp., 508 P.2d S3K„ S42 (I Had \{K« U (hearsa\ llial would not he admissible al triai wiij be
disregarded where ultroduced in affidavit opposing summary judgment). Utah courts have
noted that double hearsay in particular is inherently unreliable and presents a high probability
for inaccuracy. State in Interest of W.S., 939 P.2d 196. 701 0Tiah Ct. App. 1997) (due to
unreliability and I ligh probability ot inaceuiacv „ double hearsay should ne\er cMisiilutr ihe
sole basis for the dispositional pi lase of a proceeding) (citation omitted).
The City argues that both of Mr. McPherson's statements should be admitted under
one of four exceptions to the general hearsay rule. Upon examination, each of the City's
arguments must fail as a matter of law.
A.

Both components nl iVIi lUrl'lici'son's double hearsay statement are
inadmissible.

Mr. McPherson's statement purporting to relate what Mr. Johnson told Mr.
McPherson what Mr. Spears told Mr. Johnson about a year earlier is a textbook instance of

"double hearsay." The relevant portion of Mr. McPherson's statement is as follows:
Q.

. . . I'm talking about conversations you had with Mr. Johnson. Do you recall
discussing with him about the installation?

A.

Yes.
* * *

Q.

Did he talk to you about any modifications to the rain cap?

A.

Yes.
* * *

Q.

Did Mr. Johnson ever say that Wheeler had directed any of those
modifications?

A.

Yes.

Q.

The best of your knowledge, what was his language; what did he say?

A.

It was as a result of a conflict in the fit-up between the thimble and what most
people call the muffler silencer, and that he was told by, I believe it was Bob
Spears, to make it fit.

Q.

That's the language from Mr. Johnson?

A.

Yes.
Jfc

%

*

Q.

To the best of your knowledge, what did [Mr. Johnson] say happened?

A.

As I recall, he said he was told, his guidance from Wheeler and Mr. Spears, I
believe it was, was to make it fit.
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* * *

And do you recall in which of these conversations you had with Mr. Johnson
that that was passed on to you?
i\

N" I don't recall.

Q

All right. Did he repeal lh.il inoa lhaii'Mi v°

A.

Yes.

Q.

And in all cases did he indicate that Mr. Spears was the source of the language,
"Make it fit"?

- A.

Yes.

(R. at 339-42.)
1 his stainnent \u H ild he admissible only if both of the two hearsay components of the
statement independently came under one of the hearsay exceptions identified in the I Itah
Rules of Evidence. I Jtah R. Evid. 805 ("hearsay included will iii i hearsay is in»l excluded
under the hearsay rule if each, part of tf ic combii led statements conforn is witl t an excepiion
to the hearsa) mle pm\ ided in llicc mlc > ). If the more distant second-level of hearsay
regarding Mr. Spears' purported statement is inadmissible, then the first-level of hearsay
regarding Mr. Johnson's purported statement is likewise inadmissible, inasmuel1 as it is
derivative of the second-level statement. See 4 ('It fluid s I m, Julian, imie^ on Evidence §
."' ":"'1 (7lhEd. I^y.l) i in double hearsay siiuatiuii. whether thefirsthearsay statement qualifies
a1-, a hearsay exception is dependent on whether the second hearsay statement qualifies as an
exception). Neither component of Mr. McPherson's double hearsay statement comes under
any acknowledged hearsay exception.
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1.

Mr. McPherson's statement does not qualify as an instance of Rule
801(d)(1)(A) "inconsistent statement" non-hearsay.

The City claims that it can introduce Mr. McPherson's double hearsay attributing the
statement "make it fit" to Bob Spears on the basis that Mr. Spears has denied ever having
made that statement. Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if... [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement
is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having
made the statement. . .
The statement attributed to Mr. Spears third-hand is too removed or attenuated to be
reliable or trustworthy. Mr. McPherson has no direct knowledge of the statement he
attributes to Mr. Spears, nor has the City adduced any other evidence supportive of such a
statement. Utah R. Evid. 602 provides in pertinent part that "[a] witness may not testify to
a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has
personal knowledge of the matter." See also State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 479 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) ("[u]nder Utah Rule of Evidence 602, a witness may only testify about matters
of which the witness has personal knowledge"). Utah appellate courts have interpreted Rule
602 to require that a witness "have the opportunity and the capacity to perceive the events
in question." State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 33 (Utah 1989). See State v. Calamity. 735
P.2d 39, 42 (Utah 1987) (out-of-court statements made by declarant in police investigative
report about statements made at crime scene admissible as Rule 801(d)(1)(A) non-hearsay
where declarant "had foil opportunity to perceive the [crime scene] events he described" in
the police report, including statements made by others).
24

As noted above. Mi. Mi Phci >on, liuniyh ivfatned as an i ,perl witness, was in this
instance giving fact tc^timons imi opinion testimony. If Mr. Spears had made the "make it
fit" statement directly to Mr. McPherson, or if Mr. McPherson had been able to testify that
he was a part of the actual conversation between Mr Spears am: \i;
"make it fit" directive was articulated, L^I =
statement, ano «
hears *\<

h

^^ "

i

;

. :

^ .

-u ledge oi uu,

• e; n- b!e argument that such direct first-person

an admissible inconsistent statement lor purposes ofRule 801 (d)(1)(A).

However, Mr. McPherson makes the statement second-hand by attributing the statement to
a party who not only supposedly had the conversation a \eat eadiei lit.in lu alleeecik
recounted it loiMi McPherson. hut al-o n!i><( has no recollection of receiving or repeating the
siaiement.
As such, the testimony regarding the putative Spears' statement is unreliable on two
significant scores; Mr. McPherson has no personal knowledge oi i:,.;«,.'•:.
purported recipient of the statement, has no lecolleuion ol n

I lie liijjh probabilil\ of

inaccuracy or misstatcin cut in such la\ creel den\ alive uncertain hearsay is self apparent. If
1

.tie 11 indirect evidence of an "inconsistent statement" were to be allowed umler these

attenuated circumstances, then there would be almost no circumstances where such e\; aenee
would not be admitted. The exception, would eiiw.eo\ ,-o • • •
10

.. '

'e.10

In addition, such testimony may be problematic where it is identified as being
offered for Rule 801 (d)( 1) purposes for the first time on appeal. See Martinez v. Wells, 2004
ITT App 43, Y§ 27-29, 88 P.3d 343 (evidence that proponent introduced at trial for purposes
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2.

Mr. McPherson's statement does not qualify as a Rule 801(d)(1)(A)
instance of "forgetfulness" non-hearsay.

The City claims that it can introduce McPherson's hearsay testimony of Mr. Johnson's
statement where Mr. Johnson himself has no recollection of the statement that Mr.
McPherson attributes to him. Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if... [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement
is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having
made the statement or has forgotten . . . l1
The City's argument on this score must fail for two fundamental reasons. First, a
hearsay statement that is based on another inadmissible hearsay statement by definition
cannot be admissible. As shown above, the Spears statement upon which the Johnson
statement is derived is too attenuated, and is not based on Mr. McPherson's personal
knowledge. It follows that where the underlying Spears hearsay statement is inherently
unreliable and inadmissible, that any hearsay statement derivative of it is likewise
inadmissible.

of proving evidence's content, but which proponent later argued on appeal constituted Rule
801(d)(1) non-hearsay evidence was inadmissible hearsay since it had not been offered for
Rule 801(d)(1) purposes at trial).
11

The "forgetfulness" category of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) non-hearsay is a local
expansion or elaboration on the analogous federal rule on prior inconsistent statements. See
Advisory Committee Note to Utah R. Evid. 801, subdivision (d)(1); compare Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(1). Although the corresponding federal rule does not have a specific "memory"
provision, such "lack of memory" instances are addressed under Fed. R. Evid. 801 to
impeach a witness's credibility. See David E. Binder, Hearsay Handbook (4th Ed.), §2:11.
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Second, the k\slimou> does nul conn- UIKKTIIIC Torgetfulness" non-hearsay exception
as i oiilemplak-d 'bv Utah law. The exception under I (ah lav clearly contemn!; !c^ the
instance where a witness is uncooperative or opportunistically forget! u i . - >. L * • <. • <-. \ ^
is a device to impeach a witness's credibility, not a deuu: lw -M-p
otherwise triei; i

vitness's ir isi ifficiei icies. Doi i Jol it ison was at the time the City's

employ *.:«•. H v i* ?< no evidence he was in anyway uncooperative with the City's attorneys
in giving his testimony.
It appears that only one reported Utah case, State v. laiaimo
l

1987), has addressed app;L.'...

-•

* .,

\;;

- w^t o''Torgetfulness." In

that case, the declarant was an eyewitness to a rape. .He provided a written statement to the
police the following day recounting the details of the crime together with statements made
by some of the crime's participants. At trial, the declarant could not remember soi ne of the
events recounted in his earlier written statemei it, partici darly statements 1 nade by the
perpetrators tl lat he had repeated ii i!; lis vvrittet i statement. The written statement was then
nfieivr 10 refresh his memory.

Hie declarant still could not recall the perpetrator's

utterances. The trial court then admitted the written statement into evidence as admissible
non-hearsay under Rule 801(d)(1) < )n appeal, Deiend.mi objected t" ihe udmissum of the
written statement as hcarsav

The Supreme ("our! upheld the trial court's admission based

upon "the witness's inconsistency and abrupt forgetfulness."
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The facts and outcome of Calamity are distinguishable from the facts of this case in
several important regards.

In Calamity, the hearsay evidence at issue was nearly

contemporaneous with the third-party utterance that it represented. It was offered first to
refresh the memory of a forgetful declarant, whose lack of memory was later determined to
be "abrupt" or uncooperative. Here, Mr. McPherson's testimony was not being offered for
the purpose of refreshing or rehabilitating Mr. Johnson's faulty memory. Rather, it was
offered for the truth of an alleged statement made nearly a year after the date when the
statement was supposedly made. In other words, Mr. McPherson's after-the-fact recollection
of Mr. Johnson's purported statement is just the type of inherently unreliable or potentially
manipulable testimony that the proscription against hearsay was meant to address. Again,
to allow this as an exception would be to effectively allow the exception to swallow the rule.
More important, as pointed out above, the Calamity defendant's double hearsay statements
were admitted because he was actually present when the second-level hearsay statements
where made, and thus had full opportunity to hear and observe the same. In other words, he
had Rule 602 "personal knowledge" of such statements. Here, Mr. McPherson had no
personal knowledge of the putative Spear's statement, and cannot get around the Rule 602
proscription by attributing such comments to another party who has no recollection of them.
The inherent unreliability of such proffered hearsay evidence speaks for itself.
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Neither of Mr. McPherson 's hr-i i say statements qualifies as an admissible
party-opponent admission.
The City argues that Mr. McPherson's double hearsay representation of Bob Spears'
alleged f,make it fit" statement, as well as the overheard conversation between Wl leeler
employees both qualify as instances of I a-..- >•> id-

-wv-^-w. i

i^

nan ides:

A statement is not hearsay if.. . [t]he statement is offered against a part} and
is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative
capacity, or (B) a statement of which a party has manifested an adoption rr
belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the pari) \\->
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship . . ,
I Ipon examination, neither one ofMi, McPherson's statements qualifies as a Rule 801(d)(2)
party-opponent admission.
1.

Mr. Spears' putative statement is not a cognizable party-opponent
admission.

Utah law holds that a declarant's assertion aln HI! a part \-opponent's alloyed admission
will not be admissible vvliere it is i nade < )i itside of the declarant's presence. This is consistent
will I the Rule 602 requirement that a declarant have "personal knowledge" of the hearsay
statement he is offering. Where the declarant is not present for an out-of-court statement, he
has no direct personal knowledge of such statement nor has hr bad opportuuih m observe
the speaker's acti lal participatioi i in sue! 1 statement, or tl: le speaker's demeanor in conjunction
w Hit or in reaction to the statements. See Richards v. Lake Hills, 389 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Utah
1964).
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In Richards, one of the dispositive issues was whether the plaintiff agreed to accept
a debenture bond as a time-delayed payment on a contract. The plaintiff argued that it had
not been accepted, and the defendant argued that it had been accepted. In support of its
argument, the defendant attempted to put on the testimony of its comptroller [Mr. Don] that
in aphone conversation the comptroller had had with the defendant's principal [Mr. Merrill],
and wherein the plaintiff [Mr. Richards] was present with the defendant's principal on the
other end of the phone conversation, the defendant's principal's representation to the
comptroller that the bond had been accepted as payment was an admissible party-opponent
admission inasmuch as it was purportedly made in the plaintiffs presence. Both the trial
court and the Utah Supreme Court disagreed:
The court sustained objection to questions put to the defendant's comptroller,
Homer R. Don, as to whether Mr. Merrill had made certain statements to him
over the telephone about the acceptance of the bond above referred to. The
ruling was correct even though Mr. Richards may have been in the presence
of Mr. Merrill. He was not in the presence of Mr. Don and the latter had no
direct knowledge of Mr. Richards' participation in or reaction to any such
statements.
389 P.2d at 67-68. Compare State v. Sharifpour. 2005 UT App 42, Tj 1 (unpublished opinion)
(party admission could be admitted as Rule 801(d)(2) non-hearsay where declarant
personally heard admission, admission was directed to declarant, and declarant had "personal
knowledge" of the matter inasmuch as he had "opportunity and the capacity to perceive the
events in question").
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I lere, the same considerations render Mr. McPherson's indirect hearsay statement
regarding Mr. Spears' purported party-opponent admission inadmissible. Mr. McPherson
was not present to hear Mr, Spears' alleged statement, but purports to re las i h J u I -11 a 11»I n 11.»i
Mr. Johnson told Mr. McPherson w iaa :>\i. ap jar • a / ••.

:dcr this assertion

even more problematic, ami M - ~" '•="* ^ ^ jiiabie, ^ the laci thai Mi. Johnson has no
recoiled ion of the statements that Mr. McPherson attributes to 1 lim.
Mr. McPherson's attempted testimony regarding a purported party-opponent
admission for which he was present was rightly excluded la Ilk. didi u i » Mini, and that
exclusion was entirely consistenl • \ ith llir pi' a isions of Rule 602 and Utah case lav,. If the
party-opponent admission exception were not strictly limited to instances where the declarant
was either present for the out-of-court statement or could otherwise demonstrate personal
knowledge of the same, then there would be no practical In nil > »fhis t \cepli» >n, in i>mm:h
as declarants not actually directly hearii ig or recei vii ig si ich adi 1 lissions could testify to them
final or (biirlh-haiul, or c\ on further removed. fhey could also attribute such admissions to
a M forgetful'1 recipient (such as Mr. Johnson in this case) \\h« > fas no recollection of such an
"admission" The risk of admitting unreliable, abusive or irauununi .WCJW
circumstances more than outweighs an\ probative \ aim .
unreliable e\ idenee niav offer.

31

a ;

ueh

• ;*- • acdand uiherently

2.

Overhead statements by unidentified persons are not partyopponent admissions.

Mr. McPherson claims to have overheard statements made between certain Wheeler
personnel evidencing an admission that Wheeler was involved in or had knowledge about
the muffler support system at issue. The relevant testimony reads as follows:
Q.

Was there any Wheeler person that you can even remember saying something
to the effect, "Wheeler was involved with the 4x4 installation or selection
before the fire"?

A.

I didn't ask that question. I listened to the conversation about that.

Q.

But did anybody from Wheeler ever say that?

A.

The conversation was that it was a decision that Wheeler was engaged in to
help make that decision.

Q.

My question is, did you hear from any Wheeler person that —

A.

Yes.

Q.

And do you recall who?

A.

I want to say it was Bill Rose, Bob Spears and/or Bill Rose, or both.

Q.

Well, give us the best of your knowledge today what this individual from
Wheeler said about that.

A.

The exact words I can't remember.

Q.

I know. Give me as best you can.

A.

That it had become an issue and to solve it there was going to have to be some
supports for the silencer, and the question of the weight on the existing trusses
had come up. And so the conversation was that they had to put additional
trusses up and install these 4x4s that would stretch out across those trusses.
The exact conversation I cannot relay to you.
32

And was there anyone at Wheeler who said, "And Wheeler was involved with
that discussion before the fire"?
t V.

It was a subject of discussion among them and it was oh'1* h>iis tiivii v' .'*., v er
was involved.

Q.

Well, you've reached that coi ich isioi i Bui inv question is, I'm looking for
somebody's language.

A.

But I reached that conclusion simply because I heard them talking about it as
they had collectively been involved and made that decision before.

(R. at34>46.)
In order to qualify as aparty-opponei it adn lissioi i, the proffered statement must meet
some minimal specificity and evidence requirements. The statement is not self-validating
simply because it was made and purports to relay a party-opponent admission. 4 Fishman,
supra § 27:26. There must be evidence that an authorized agent in fact made me siaiement
by proving or at least providing the identity of the actual persoi 11 i mkii lg the admission.
4 KL § -27:25. Once tin identification ha-; been mad1.1 lliere must be some evidence or
indication thai I ha I individual was authorized to speak on the subject of the admission, or that
such matter was within the scope of his or her job responsibilities. 4 idL § 27:27; see also
Utah R. Evid. 801(2)(2)(C). The purported admission cannot be a matter ofspeculaln m 4
Fishman, supra § 2/ li, (I will lu. noi IK admissible v\ww \\\\ purported admission itself is
too ambiguou «• <1 id tj v7 II

11 therefore follows that inadequate proof that the putative

admission was made by a party or its agent renders the statement inadmissible hearsay. 5
Jack B. Weinstein and Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein 9s Federal Evidence § SO I .>• »| »11 .\l
Ed 1997).
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While Mr. McPherson allegedly overheard some remarks from Wheeler personnel
discussing Wheeler's putative involvement of a year earlier relative to the muffler support
system, the fact that he overheard such conversations and was not directly involved in them
raise many of the same issues involved with the alleged Spears' comments discussed in
Section B.l. above. First, and most significant, Mr. McPherson cannot provide with any
degree of certainty the actual identity of persons who may have made the alleged comments.
Although he throws out the names of two Wheeler employees as possible participants in the
conversation, he cannot say with even minimal certainty whether those two individuals
actually made such comments, or whether it was other unidentified persons making the
comments. (R. at 343-45.) Examples of the lack of specificity are evident from the
following excepts of McPherson's testimony found in the Record at pp.343-46: M[t]here was
a discussion about - - at some point in time . . ."; "[w]ell, I heard that discussion in and
about with Wheeler people and Don Johnson and maybe other people from the City";" [w]ell,
I'm not clear as to who all were the Wheeler people that were there in Hurricane"; "[a]nd
it was obvious to me that this had been a subject of a discussion between Wheeler and the
City and other contractors . . ."; "I didn't ask that question. I listened to the conversation
about that"; "I want to say it was Bill Rose, Bob Spears and/or Bill Rose, or both"; "[t]he
exact words I can't remember"; M[t]he exact conversation I cannot relay to you."
Mr. McPherson gave no specifics as to what was said, the circumstances under which
the alleged comments were made, or whether the purported speakers even had a basis for
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saying anything about the subject. The best he can give is his vague impression of a casual
discussion between unidentified people milling around the fire scene. Even were Wheeler
personnel to have made such comments, the comments would not have been party-opponent
admissions where those personnel had no responsibility for or participation in the work at
issue. Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(C), (D). They are also not admissions where made outside
of the scope of work or not made while carrying out any aspects of the job. See Wayment
v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 2005 UT 25, ^ 46,116 P.3d 271 (out-of-court statement
by defendant's secretary to co-worker was not a Rule 801(d)(2) party-opponent admission
where subject matter was not within secretary's scope of employment, and statement was
made on cigarette break where defendant's employees were not carrying out any aspect of
their employment).
In summary, the district court had before it the specific testimony of Richard Carlson
as to what was said and done during the time the City installed the rain cap and the muffler
system. It also had before it the City's records with regard to the decision to install the 4x4
timbers as well as the fact that the City's own contractor Telecon was to do that work. It had
Don Johnson's testimony. It had Robert Spear's affidavit. Although a summary judgment
motion is not designed to weigh testimony, nonetheless, the fact remains that the best the
City can offer against all of the clear and unequivocal testimony that Wheeler was not
involved in any way with the roof support system for the mufflers are the vague and
ambiguous recountings by Mr. McPherson of year-old third-party casual conversations.
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Such attenuated, vague and uncertain testimony lacks sufficient trustworthiness to be
accepted or considered for the purpose of defeating a Motion for Summary Judgment. It is
submitted that Rule 801(d)(1) was never meant to countenance such attenuated or dubious
hearsay.
VI.

MR. McPHERSON'S TESTIMONY, EVEN IF ADMITTED, WOULD NOT
RAISE A MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT.
Even if, for the sake of argument, Mr. McPherson's hearsay statements constituted

Rule 801 non-hearsay, they fail to raise any material issue of fact. Utah R. Civ. P. 56 "does
not preclude summary judgment simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only
when a material fact is genuinely controverted." Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d
1390 (Utah 1980). As the City itself has admitted in its Appellant Brief, Utah contract law
would not place any responsibility on Wheeler unless it directed the manner and nature of
the work of its subcontractors. Johnson v. Dep't of Transp., 2004 UT App 284,98 P.3d 773;
Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 979 P.2d 322. Mr. Carlson testified specifically as to the
detailed instructions he received from Don Johnson, the City employee and also as to the
decisions he himself made. An instruction by a Wheeler employee not present in person to
a City employee to pass on to the welder to "make it fit" is not control over either Mr.
Carlson or Mr. Johnson as to a decision to modify the rain cap. This is particularly true
where Robert Spears had never been on the roof and was unaware of the materials being used
to support the mufflers, namely the metal cradle and the 4x4 timbers. Moreover, all the work
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was done in one day, at a time when no Wheeler employee was even on site. (R. at 278281.)12 Thus any communication from a Wheeler employee would have had to come by
telephone. There is no testimony whatsoever that either Don Johnson or Richard Carlson
received telephone instructions during the time they were on the roof. Even if there had been
a phone call that day, there is no conceivable reason why Bob Spears ever would have
offered his opinion since he was not on-site to observe the problem. However, even if he did
give an instruction to Don Johnson to pass on to Richard Carlson to "make it fit," such an
instruction would not defeat the retained control doctrine anymore than in the case of
Thompson v.Jess, 1999 UT 22,979 P.2d 322, where the only instruction from the owner was
to put a certain pipe in a particular place. To tell the welder to "make it fit" gives no specific
direction on how the work is to be done. Thus no material issue of fact has been raised by the
"make it fit" statement.
Likewise the claimed overheard conversation about Wheeler's supposed involvement
a year earlier in selecting and/or approving the muffler support system is so ambiguous,
unspecific and unreliable as to not raise a material issue of fact. Whatever may have been
casually discussed, without specific recitation as to what was said or by whom it was said,
there could be no admission against interest that Wheeler had any involvement whatsoever

12

The exact testimony was: "We installed the pipe, they [the City] put the muffler
on after we welded the flanges, we installed the rain cap and left. It was all done in one day."
(R. at 280-281.) "Q. Was any representative of Wheeler around at the time you were putting
the rain cap on? A. Not to my recollection." (R. at 279.)
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with regard to the 4x4 timber system of which there is no evidence that the unidentified
speakers had any knowledge until after the fire.
VII.

THE CITY IS TRYING TO RAISE NEW AND UNSUBSTANTIATED FACTS.
This case is best explained by comparing the City's Response Memorandum filed in

opposition to Wheeler's summary judgment motion in the district court with the Brief filed
by the City in this present appeal and further comparing those two documents with the
Complaint and the Amended Complaint in this case. The obvious pattern that appears is that
the City's position and legal stance continually changes, morphs, and expands to take on new
legal contours and claims as its previous ones are either legally refuted or unsupported by the
evidence.
The original Complaint was one of a claim of product liability, specifically referring
to Wheeler as a distributor, seller, supplier, assembler, and installer of power generators and
related exhaust systems. See ^ 5 of Complaint. (R. at 2.) In response to Wheeler's Motion
to Dismiss based on the argument that two-year product liability statute of limitations
governed the case, the City then amended its Complaint to refer to Wheeler as only an
installer of power generators and related exhaust systems in an obvious attempt to skirt the
product liability limitation period. See ^ 5 of Amended Complaint. (R. at 43.) After
Wheeler submitted its Motion for Summary Judgment based on, among other things, the fact
that the City had directed the way the rain caps at issue (identified as the source of the
problem) were modified, the City responded, using double hearsay, to claim direct
involvement by Wheeler in the installation and modification of the rain caps.
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Now, the City raises a claim which has never existed before the appeal and which
finds no basis whatsoever in any of the facts, namely that Wheeler was the mastermind
behind the decision to put 4x4 timbers on the roof to support the mufflers, which timbers
were the fuel source for the fire. (See, e.g.. City's Brief at 5-6, 20, 23-24.) However, there
is no testimony whatsoever in the Record for such a claim raised for the first time on
appeal.13 To the contrary, the testimony is unequivocal that at all meetings at which the
timber support concept was discussed, no representative of Wheeler was ever present or
involved. (R. at 198-99,327-28,433.) The sole participants at such meetings were the City,
its engineer, and its general contractor. (R. at 286-89.) There is no testimony that Wheeler
even knew the timbers would be placed on the roof as a support for the muffler system. To
the contrary, there is affirmative testimony that Wheeler did not know anything about the
timbers until after the fire, much less directing the way that they were put on the roof. The
best the City can say is that after the fire, its fire expert Richard McPherson overheard some
conversations which suggested to him (without any investigation or precisely recalling the
particulars of the conversation) that Wheeler had some involvement with the 4x4 timbers.
As such, the City should not be allowed to create new claims on appeal, much less claims
which have no support in the Record.

13

Interestingly enough, the district court's Summary Ruling warned in a footnote
that on appeal "facts which were not presented to the trial court at all" often become the basis
for a reversal of summary judgment. (R. at 481.) The City appears to be trying to give
further basis for the district court judge's concerns.
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VIII. THE CITY'S AMENDED COMPLAINT DID NOT ALLEGE A FAILURE TO
TRAIN CITY PERSONNEL.
In the City's Response Memorandum filed with the district court, there was at best a
casual reference to a claim that Wheeler did not provide proper training to the City's
employees. When the subject came up again during argument on the Motion, Wheeler's
counsel noted that nowhere in the City's Complaint does the City make that particular claim.
(Transcript (R. at 501) at page 66.) However on appeal that claim has now blossomed into
a several page discussion. (See City's Brief at pp. 17-19.) Therefore it must be emphasized
once again that the Amended Complaint is devoid of such a claim and no request to further
amend the Complaint to include such a claim was ever made by the City. Hence, any and
all claims regarding failure to train City employees should be disregarded because (and in
addition to the other arguments made herein) they are not in the City's Amended Complaint,
nor were they sufficiently raised below.
IX.

THE CITY ATTEMPTED TO FILE A SUR-REPLY WITHOUT PRIOR
PERMISSION OF THE DISTRICT COURT, AND THAT COURT RIGHTLY
REJECTED IT.
The City complains that the Court improperly denied its Sur-Reply Memorandum.

Aside from the fact, as noted above, that Wheeler did not raise any new issues in its Reply
Memorandum that were not in direct response to issues raised in the City's opposition
Memorandum, the City failed to follow the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1) when it
submitted its extra Memorandum without prior court approval. As such, the City's attempted
Sur-Reply was properly denied on both counts.
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CONCLUSION
The City's claims are clearly barred by the product liability Statute of Limitations as
well as by the retained control doctrine. The Court should disregard as inadmissable hearsay
all of Mr. McPherson testimony about punitive Wheeler activities relative to the rain caps
and the 4x4 timbers. The granting of the Summary Judgment should be affirmed in all
respects.
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ADDENDUM

Utah R.Evid. 801.
Definitions. The following definitions apply under this article [Article VII.
Hearsay]:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes the statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(d)( 1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement
and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the
witness denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent
with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the
person; or
(d)(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered
against a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or
a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested
an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by
the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the
party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement
by a coconspirator of party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
Utah R. Evid. 802.
Hearsay rule. Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these
rules.
Utah R. Evid. 805.
Hearsay within hearsay. Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded
under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with
an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules.
2

Utah Code Ann. §78-15-3.
Statute of limitations [for product liability claims]. A civil action under this
chapter [Title 78, Chapter 15, Product Liability Act] shall be brought within
two years from the time the individual who would be the claimant in such
actions discovered, both the harm and its cause.

Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6.
Defect or defective condition making product unreasonably dangerous Rebuttable presmumption. In any action for damages for personal injury,
death, or property damage allegedly caused by a defect in a product:
(1) No product shall be considered to have a defect or to be in a
defective condition, unless at the time the product was sold by the
manufacturer or other initial seller, there was a defect or defective condition
in the product which made the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer.
(2) As used in this act, "unreasonably dangerous" means that the
product was dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by
the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or user of that product in that
community considering the product's characteristics, propensities, risks,
dangers and uses together with any actual knowledge, training, or experience
possessed by that particular buyer, user or consumer.
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is free from any
defect or defective condition where the alleged defect in the plans or designs
for the product or the methods and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting
and testing the product were in conformity with government standards
established for that industry which were in existence at the time the plans or
designs for the product or the methods and techniques of manufacturing,
inspecting and testing the product were adopted.
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